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1 Introduction
Finland is a country which after the war developed an innovative trade policy.
We suggest in this paper that a useful way to evaluate the trade relations is pro-
vided by their ability to manage macroeconomic risks. Forest products were the
dominating export products for Finland in the Western markets. Its gigantic
paper companies had a large share in the foreign markets for paper and timber.
Such markets, however, were cyclical in that the demand for paper and tim-
ber had a substantial cyclical demand component. Two policy strategies were
developed by the country. First, the exchange rate policy was geared towards
the option of devaluation of the Finnish markka whenever the pro…tability of
its major export sector had turned down. Such adjustments became frequently
necessary once this policy principle was imbedded in the expectations of the em-
ployers’ and employees’ organizations.1 There was room for an obvious moral
hazard in the collective wage bargaining of these organizations at the expense
of other sectors. The labor unions, in particular, learned how to exploit their
position when the companied had committed to irreversible investments in spe-
ci…c assets like paper mills.2 Second, special trade arrangements in terms of a
bilateral mutual exchange between Finland and Soviet Union were developed.
Finland exported consumer goods like textiles, shoes, clothing but also metal
products and investment goods. Construction exports were also important par-
ticular when Kostamus, a mining industrial city was built in Karelia. Energy
was exported by Soviet Union. It is well-known that the Finnish trading part-
ners were better informed of how to price the products. In the Soviet trade, the
pro…t margins were therefore quite large exceeding those in the Western Finnish
trade.
Such a bilateral trade agreement developed into a remarkable trade sector.3
Actually, its roots are in the war remuneration which Finland had to pay to
Soviet Union after the Second World War was over. The renumeration amounted
to 300 million gold dollars (subsequently reduced to 226,5 dollars) during seven
years but had to be delivered in terms of products and captured at the highest
15 -16 per cent of the budget of the government up to 1952 when the debt was
considered to be paid.4 Many industries were developed to meet the Soviet
1The duration of the devaluation cycle was typically about one decade. It is well-known
that the idea of the devaluation cycle was introduced and discussed by several Finnish econo-
mists, including Tuure Junnila, Sixten Korkman, Pekka Korpinen, Seppo Kykkänen, and
Jouko Paunio. It was further evaluated by Korpinen (1981). An illuminating discussion on
the history of Finnish economic policy after the post war period is provided by Lindblom
(2002).
2The economic analysis of such bargaining became understood with the paper by Grout
(1984).
3The picture attached provides information on the Finnish exports to Russia/Soviet Union
over two hundred years. As the Grand Duchy of the Russia empire since 1809, the Finnish
exports developed favorably. At the outbreak of the First World War, its exports accelerated
as Russia needed both inputs for the war industry and food supplies. The trade ended for a
long period after Finland had become independent in 1917. Our focus here is on the years
after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991.
4 It should be mentioned that Finland was actually the only country which paid all the war
requirements, especially the metal industry.5
The subsequent bilateral Soviet trade was viewed as an appropriate risk
insurance device for Finland given that the Western export market was the
subject of demand shocks and business cycles. Its share amounted to 20-25 per
cent of the total Finnish exports in the 1980s, reduced subsequently by about
half during the last few years of the Soviet Union and collapsed down to just
a few per cent with the breakdown of Soviet Union. There was also a loss to
Finland in that she had been running a trade surplus for quite some time and
the Russian state did not pay the Soviet debts to Finland.
The adverse demand shock was then substantial leading to to a collapse of
GNP by 13 % in 1991-93. It was associated with a foreign exchange crisis as
Finland tried unsuccessfully to peg its exchange rate relative to the western
trade basket. This shock also led to a severe banking crisis. The new recovery
did not start before 1994. Once it started, it was accompanied by an unexpected
emergence of a new industry, the telecommunication, with the Nokia company
as the North Star.
This paper studies the international trade arrangements during and after the
cold war. It employs the tools of economics and …nance to examine ex post the
risk management implications of the two trade strategies. The Finnish bilateral
trade with Soviet Union during the cold war has been viewed as an insurance
instrument in phase of cyclical export markets in the Western trade. The sub-
sequent shift to market-determined international trade has intensi…ed both the
transmission of demand and other shocks but also provided a more e¢cient risk
management through extended diversi…cation. Moreover, it is predicted by the
economic analysis that the Ricardian principle of comparative advantage oper-
ates more e¢ciently in the decentralized trade arrangements. We acknowledge
that the …nal verdict, however, should rest on the econometric work on those
issues.
In Section 2 of this paper, we analyze this mechanism using a non-cooperative
game theoretic model. Section 3 evaluates the post-war foreign trade policy of
Finland. In Section 4, we characterize the trade during the second wave of
globalization, i.e. the period over the three past decades.
remuneration demanded after the war.
5Other economic adjustments included resettlement of 11 per cent of the 1940 population
in the remaining parts of the country when the Karelia area, a tenth of the territory of
Finland, was lost to Soviet Union. Interesting enough, when studying the data on forced
migrants, Sarvimäki, Uusitalo and Jäntti (2009) report that displacement increased the long-
term income of men, though having no e¤ect on that of women. They attribute a large part of
the e¤ect to faster transition from traditional (rural) to modern (urban) occupations among
the displaced. Many Karelian enterprises were re-established in Lahti area, including Kääpä
Oy and Starckjohann Oy.
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2 Bilateral Trade: A Multi-Period Game Theo-
retic Model
This model was developed in Kanniainen and Mustonen (1989). They write
"It has been held as sacrosanct within political folklore that such balanced bilat-
eral trade is a blessing for both economies. Yet, in terms of traditional welfare
economics, multilateral trade arrangements, with the opportunity of short-term
international borrowing and lending, are generally regarded as conducive to im-
proved welfare in contrast to the situation whereby trade has to be balanced".
The model sheds light on this issue.
In their analysis, variations in the level of bilateral trade may be a conse-
quence of an optimizing outcome over a long period which is, in itself a re‡ection
of mutual understanding how to split potential joint bene…ts. They …nd it likely
that in a multi-period context, there are stabilizing mechanisms involved which
give rise to welfare gains relative to one-period bilateral agreements in trade.
They show that the trading partners may realize that over a stretch of time,
a trade rule based on intertemporal comparison of mutual bene…ts and losses
forms a subgame perfect equilibrium. The resultant equilibrium is claimed to
satisfy the property of time-consistency. Interestingly enough, this equilibrium
does not require a cooperative approach with binding contracts. Rather, the
equilibrium is obtained through purely non-cooperative behavior.
Consider hence mutual imports to be the choice variables of the market econ-
omy (ME, Finland) and the centrally planned economy (CPE, Soviet Union).
As trade is balanced for each period, the choice of imports determines also the
exports. It will be demonstrated that, in a repeated game, their actual values
may be di¤erent from their desired values in a one-period game. The latter is
denoted by ? (the desired imports of the ME from the CPE) and ? (the de-
sired imports of the CPE from the ME). The focus will be on the short-term
policy goal of stabilization of domestic production and employment. The ME
is viewed to be a small open economy operating under pegged exchange rates;
the multilateral export demand (?) is regarded as the basic source of aggregate
demand shock. Breaking down the trade balance of the ME into its multilateral
and bilateral components, its aggregate output (?) is determined according to
the open economy supply-demand equality (the Keynesian IS-curve),
? = ?(?) + ?+ ?? (1)
where ?(?) gives the standard aggregate domestic demand.
Assume that there is an unpredictable change, say a reduction in multilateral
exports, ?? The ME is able to stabilize its production if it can persuade the CPE
to increase its imports ?? For this to happen, two conditions must be satis…ed.
First, the suggested policy change has to be optimal for the CPE from the point
of view of its long-term aims. Second, given the balanced trade requirement, the
ME has to be willing to increase its imports from the CPE (?) in the short run.
In view of the goal of stabilizing production ? in (1), a given realization of ?
de…nes a unique desired value for imports ?? Any deviation of the actual trade,
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to be denoted by ?? from the desired value ? is viewed to lead to increasing
welfare losses to the ME in terms of aggregate employment. Let 0 ? ? ? 1
denote the discount factor of the ME, its intertemporal welfare loss can be
stated as
? = §1? ?
?(?? ¡ ??)2? (2)
The CPE is viewed to have a desired target imports from the ME (denoted
by ?). Again, as its deviation from the actual trade are regarded as welfare-
decreasing, the welfare loss of the CPE can be presented as
? = §1? ?
??(?? ¡??)2? ?? = ?? ? ? 0? (3)
We notice that we have assumed the same discount rates for both economies
and that the desired level of trade ? is …xed.
The information structure of the game is as follows. The game starts in pe-
riod 0 when there is a draw from the probability distribution of ?. The outcome
is public information to both trading partners. Then both make simultaneous
moves (proposals concerning the actual level of trade, ?). The game is repeated
at in…nitum. The probability distribution of ?1 · ? · ?2 is denoted by ? and
is fully determined by that of ?? Denoting ?? = minf?? ?g the trade strat-
egy when one-period targets are chosen, the one-period expected welfare losses
under such strategy are given by
?[??? ] =
Z ?
?1
?(? ¡ ?)2?? (?) (4)
?[??? ] =
Z ?2
?
(? ¡ ?)2?? (?)? (5)
The expected discounted welfare losses over the whole future horizon under
??¡strategy are then given in period ? by
?(?? ) = ?(? ¡??? )2 + ??(??? )? ? = ??(1 ¡ ?) (6)
?(?? ) = (?? ¡??? )2 + ??(??? )? (7)
The question now is whether alternative trade strategies can be found which
lead to smaller welfare losses compared with these. The question arises for the
reason that when ?? ? ??the CPE has an incentive to proposes an increase in
trade over and above ?? ? Similarly, the ME has an incentive to proposes an
increase when ?? ? ?? In light of the Folk theorem, there are obviously a great
many ways to divide the potential joint bene…ts. A natural candidate for a
(Pareto-)superior strategy in a multi-period context is the weigted average of
the one-period targets, de…ned as
??? = ?? + (1 ¡ ?)???
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where the weights re‡ect the relative negotiating power of the trading partners.
The paper by Kanniainen and Mustonen (1989) …nds the conditions under
which ?? is an equilibrium strategy, allowing the partners to sustain an outcome
that strictly dominates the outcome in the corresponding repeated one-period
game. Given the probability distribution ? (?) and the parameters of the loss
function, the authors show that there is an upper limit for the rate of time pref-
erence of the trading partners which cannot be exceeded to make the suggested
strategy Pareto-superior. The game was supposed to last for ever. With the
breakdown of the CPE, it became terminated.
3 Collective Risk Insurance and Visible Hand
Shakes
The governmental controls have been quite extensive in shaping the post-war
Finnish economic progress not only in the foreign trade policy in Finland. Many
other institutional arrangements in the sense of collective insurance mechanisms
were developed to manage macroeconomic and industry risks in Finland (Kan-
niainen (1993)). In promoting the foreign trade, governmental guarantees were
widely employed. Tax policy was directed to promote internal corporate invest-
ment in growing industries. Competition policy explicitly allowed for cartels up
to 1988 when they became illegal (Feldman (2009)). Actually, until 1958 there
was no competition law in the country. Subsequently, cartels became allowed
but had to be registered. Over the period of its existence, the Finnish Cartel
Regsitry registered as many as 900 cartels.
Monetary policy was built on the control of bank credit, regulation of the
average lending rates, and cartel in the accumulation of bank deposits with
untaxed deposit interest income. As mentioned, the foreign exchange policy was
based on the option to devalue the currency whenever the success of the export
sector was at stake. Incomes policy was developed to manage wage formation
in the spirit of the corporatist Nordic model. The key principle echoed the
development in the cooperative game theory, it was the time of "consensus".
For decades, the visible hand of policy-makers worked quite well. The coun-
try developed economically. There were large economic gains. There were also
economic costs. The incomes policy which was considered a necessary input re-
sulted in an economy which was highly sensitive to business cycles. The export
shocks were aggravated by the domestic institutional mechanisms. Monetary
policy did not succeed in stabilizing the economy. It was the contrary which
was the case. The in‡ation rate climbed high in international comparisons. The
celebrated incomes policy had its side e¤ects. From time to time, union strikes
shaped the economic progress.
The bilateral trade was only loosely - if at all - linked to the price system.6
The second source of ine¢ciency could be traced to the political/business rela-
tions. In economics, such relations are seldom regarded as an e¢cient approach
6More on this topic, one can …nd in Holopainen (2007).
5
though informational gains might be available.7 As a result, the quality of the
export products in the Soviet market was secondary and could not qualify for
the Western market. Most dramatic, with the Soviet collapse, a substantial
share of the bilateral trade was wiped away. The mechanism though to provide
an insurance had instead become the source of a dramatic shock which no other
country in Europe had experienced since the war.8
4 The Second Globalization Wave in the World
Trade
The access to Western markets was developed step by step despite the e¤orts
of Soviet Union to maintain its political control. Finland joined the Western
trade organizations one after the other.9 Ultimately, Finland joined EU and its
monetary union.10
Starting with the …rst wave of the world globalization in the late 19th cen-
tury, Finland has bene…ted from the import of foreign capital. Many foreign
names like Gutzeit, Fazer, Finlayson, Sinebrycho¤ etc. are from those decades
when the economic foundations for many industries were built. Subsequently,
Finland has enjoyed the advantages of foreign markets by exporting paper and
timber. After the Great Finnish Depression in 1991-93, the export sectors ex-
panded to capture metal and electronics in particular. Finland has also sub-
stantially bene…ted from the second globalization phase of the world economy
over the past thirty years. With the changed trade arrangements, the insurance
mechanisms associated with the trade have substantially changed as follows.
(i) The overall stability of the economy has increased substantially for
the reason that the country has given up its autonomous domestic monetary
policy by joining the European monetary union. Finland joined the common
market with the target of free mobility of goods, labor and capital. One im-
portant source of instability - domestic policy mistakes - has been eliminated.
This choice is di¤erent from what Sweden did as she decided to keep its own
currency as an insurance device. Finland has indeed bene…ted from historically
low interest rates and stable monetary conditions. Sweden has not done much
7There are numerous amusing stories about the close political relations between the Russian
and Finnish leaders. Here is one of them. This did not take place in sauna where their
discussions were often held. This happened at the dinner table. In the story President Urho
Kekkonen observed during the dinner that the Soviet party leader Leonid Breznev was secretly
picking up silver spoons from the dinner table putting them in the pocket of his suit. Kekkonen
stood up stating he is going to give a speech and …nish it by making a trick. He picked up
his silver spoon putting in the pocket of his suit stating: "You see that I put the spoon in my
pocket but now I surprise you by picking it up from Mr. Breznev’s pocket."
8A leading politician, Paavo Väyrynen had predicted in his book (1988) accepted by Abo
Academi as a Ph.D. thesis, that Soviet Union is a permanent construction.
9One of the opponents for the attempts of Finland to integrate into the Western markets
was Erkki Tuomioja, subsequently the Finnish foreign minister. His book ??????? ??? ???
argued against the membership.
10Paavo Väyrynen and Erkki Tuomioja were the leading politicians who were actively
against the Finnish membership in EU and in the European Monetary Union.
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worse in terms of stability but its gains from the depreciation of its currency in
the recent crisis have been at most temporary. Absence of the exchange rate as
a policy tool has had its cost: the euro appreciated for example against the US
$ by more 50 % within a decade but so far it can be argued that the gains of ab-
staining from independent monetary policy have been far greater than its costs.
Moreover, the European market is of course far more important for Finland
than the US market.
(ii) By internal adjustment, Finland passed its 1991-93 crisis and man-
aged to maintain government …scal stability.
(iii) Collective wage bargaining has been abolished to allow for greater
di¤erences in wage formation between industries and more appropriate with the
principles of the globalized world. This step can be viewed as an approach to
search for the true comparative advantages.11
(iv) Production of many export goods has, however, moved to the devel-
oping economies to take the advantage of their comparative advantage in such
activities. There are therefore new pressures to develop new industries.
(v) There has been room for more risk-taking. The country and its
companies have actively invested in R&D to produce innovations in new high-
tech industries. It has not been slow second but a fast …rst.
(vi) The export sector is more diversi…ed than ever before, faces a strict
competition abroad and is controlled by international governance principles im-
posed by internationalized company ownership.
By these arrangements, the country has experienced a shift from the old era
of high in‡ation, strong business cycles and "lazy capital" to the era of "e¢cient
capital" where the return to capital is determined in the international …nancial
market.
5 Conclusions
Trade and exchange are the keys to the economic welfare. In Finland, the trade
policy has gone a long way from the bilateral arrangements towards market-
based trade. Trade is governed by the Ricardian principle of comparative ad-
vantage and the …rms are searching for those advantages by their location de-
cisions. The target of isolating the economies from the demand and supply
shocks is more demanding as the shocks are spread all over in the globalized
world. This is the true price of globalization. The bene…ts include the more
diversi…ed economic structures to meet the economic shocks.
The most recent economic crisis shows that the global economy is a closed
system. In a closed system, economic risks cannot be diversi…ed away – though
the diversi…cation remains the key risk management device both for investors
and trade policy. The derivatives represent a new risk management device at
the investor level. The crisis shows, however, that those innovations have to
be planned and managed more carefully than has been done in the past. One
11As a consequence, the implicit subsidy to high-productivity …rms which existed with
centralized bargaining has been eliminated.
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conclusion is clear. When countries become economically more linked together,
the world becomes safer: the costs of lost economic prosperity will not be easily
wiped out by hostile activities. The recent economic crisis has, however, led
to increasing protectionist policy stances in many countries. In public procure-
ments, domestic producers tend to be favored. Domestric automobile industries,
for example, are supported by national governments. Buy American Act in the
USA has a long history but has recently been partly mitigated in the face of
the increasing fears of trade wars. The wars will not disappear. But they may
become warmer instead of being cold.
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